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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose a replication detection scheme based on cluster-based structure. Our scheme employs the 
authenticated claim, neighbor proof and travel-time as the basic means of constructing replication detection procedure 
in order to avoid the need for public key cryptography and reduce storage overhead. Our scheme can effectively 
detect replica nodes and prevent replica nodes from adding sensor networks. Moreover, our scheme has no use for 
periodical replica detection and greatly decreases communication overhead. The analysis of security and performance 
shows that our scheme not only can resist node replication attack, but also has low computation overhead and smaller 
storage overhead. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
So far, some replication detection schemes have proposed. In 2005, Parno et al.[1] proposed first the 
node replication attacks. They proposed Randomized Multicast and Line-Selected Multicat protocols. In 
Randomized Multicast protocol, each node broadcasts a location claim to its neighbors. Then each 
neighbor selects some random locations within the network and forwards the location claim with a 
probability to the nodes closest to chosen locations by using geographic routing. According to Birthday 
Paradox, at least one witness node is likely to receive conflicting location claims when replicated nodes 
exist in the network. In order to reduce the communication costs and increase the probability of detection, 
they proposed Line-Selected Multicast protocol. Besides storing location claims in randomly selected 
witness nodes, the intermediate nodes for forwarding location claims can also be witness nodes. In 2009, 
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Ho et al. [2] proposed a distributed replication detection scheme to identify and revoke replica nodes. In 
their scheme, nodes are expected to be in their home zone and are marked by their neighbors as trusted if 
it is the case. The nodes of place their home zones have to prove their legitimacy by requesting their 
neighbors to forward their location claims to their home zones for conflicting location claim detection. 
Because the assumption of the deployment knowledge is not often reasonable and general, the heavy 
dependence on it makes the scheme undesirable. Furthermore, the scheme also uses the expensive public 
key cryptography for location claim generation and verification. In 2010, Fu et al. [3] proposed a novel 
approach against node replication attacks by key pre-distribution. Every node just could establish 
pairwise key with its location and time binding called LTB. In their scheme, every node just could 
establish pairwise key with its neighbors in the location that are assigned to nodes. Therefore, replica 
nodes can’t establish shared key with its neighbors unless they are deployed in the location where 
duplicated nodes lie. In this way, sensor nodes in the networks need not periodically detect replica nodes. 
However, we fond that LTB has following disadvantages (1) If a attacker captures a node SN and deploys 
the replica nodes of SN in the communication range of SN’s neighbors, LTB can’t stop these replica nodes 
into networks. (2) When a legal node is first deployed in networks, LTB can’t stop it establishing shared 
key with replica nodes. (3) LTB needs time synchronization mechanisms since it uses time Tmin to decide 
whether establish shared key with its neighbors. 
In this paper, we propose a scheme against node replication attacks based on cluster-based structure. 
Our scheme employs the authenticated claim, neighbor proof and travel-time as the basic means of 
constructing replication detection procedure in order to avoid the need for public key cryptography and 
reduce storage overhead. Our scheme can effectively detect replica nodes and prevent replica nodes from 
adding sensor networks. Moreover, our scheme has no use for periodical replica detection and greatly 
decreases communication overhead. The analysis of security and performance shows that our scheme not 
only can resist node replication attack, but also has low computation overhead and smaller storage 
overhead. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The Assumptions and model is described in section 2. In 
section 3, a replication detection scheme for sensor network is presented. In section 4, the security and 
properties of the proposed scheme are analyzed. Finally, the concluding remarks are given. 
2. Assumptions and model 
In this section, we first present the underlying assumptions for our schemes and then describe the 
attacker model. 
2.1.  Network assumptions 
Our scheme uses the same network model as reference [4], that is, the sensor network consists of base 
station (BS), cluster heads (CH) and sensor nodes (S). Sensor nodes only can secretly communicate with its 
cluster head (CH) directly and can’t communicate with each other directly, Sensor nodes only forward 
message from its neighbor nodes. Cluster heads can secretly communicate with base station directly and 
can’t communicate with each other directly. We study the replication detection in a two-dimensional static 
sensor network where the locations of sensor nodes do not change after deployment. We assume sensor 
nodes are grouped together and nodes’ location of deployment can be estimated in advance as in [5] 
described.  
2.2. Attacker model 
We assume that the attacker can identify and compromise a substantial fraction of the nodes in a small 
area. He will subsequently make replicas of one or more of these nodes and attempt to distribute them 
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throughout the network. We define an effective range of a node is the communication range of the node’s 
neighbors. For example, a node S1’s neighbors are the nodes S2, S3, S4, S5, then the four dashed circle 
zones are the effective rang of the node S1 and other zones is the  
non-effective rang of the node S1 as Fig.1 shows. 
Our scheme would discuss two replication attacks as following:       
(1) The replica nodes of a node are deployed in non-effective  
range of the node. 
(2) The replica nodes of a node are deployed in effective rang  
of the node. 
3. A replication detection scheme                                                                             Fig.1 effective rang of the node S1
Our scheme employs the authenticated claim, neighbor proof and travel-time as the basic means of 
constructing replica node detection procedure in order to avoid the need for public key cryptography and 
reduce storage overhead. Our scheme consists of following sections. 
3.1. Set up 
BS chooses a finite field Fq, where q is a large odd prime of at least 160 bits, a secure one-way hash 
function H(.) and a t-degree trivariate symmetric polynomial 
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Where f(x, y, z) has a symmetric property such as f(x, y, z)= f(x, z, y)  and kjia ,, -s are the coefficients of 
f(x, y, z),  t is a positive integer. 
Before deployment, each sensor node Si can be preloaded with relevant knowledge such as a 
deployment coordinates (xi, yi), a location hash value LHi=H(xi||yi), a node secret key ki and a cluster 
secret key K, a node identifier IDi, a cluster identifier GID, a hash function H(.). Where 
)|,|,( CHCHiii LHIDLHIDGIDfk = . Besides, every node maintains a revoked nodes list. To establish 
share keys, prior to deployment, CH also is loaded a polynomial share f(GID, IDCH|LHCH, z), a cluster 
secret key K and a hash function H(.).  
3.2. Replication detection  
3.2.1.  Replication detection in non-effective range  
In this section, we present the replication detection scheme when the replica nodes of one node are 
deployed in non-effective range of the node. Our scheme uses authenticated claim and neighbor proof to 
resist node replication attacks. Replica detection consists of three phases as described below.  
(1) Authenticated claim 
When a node needs to communicate with its cluster head CH, it is asked for an identifier and location 
authenticated claim with secret pair-wise share key between the node and cluster head CH. Suppose that a 
sensor node Si (a member of the cluster GID) needs to communicate with its cluster head CH, the node Si
first generates authenticated claim zi=H(IDi, LHi, ki) and broadcasts {zi, IDi, EK{xi, yi}}. Where EK{.}
denote encryption operation with a key K using symmetrical encryption algorithm such as AES.
(2) Neighbor proof 
S
S
S
S
S
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In our scheme, each node forwards the authenticated claim and only provides neighbor proof for its 
neighbor nodes as well as ignores all messages from the replica nodes. Suppose that a sensor node Sj
receives an authenticated claim from node Si. Node Sj first checks whether its revoked nodes list contains 
node Si or not. If its revoked nodes list doesn’t contain Si, node Sj decrypts EK{xi, yi}and gets (xi, yi), then 
checks whether the distance between the deployment points of node Si and node Sj is smaller than a pre-
defined system threshold distance R. i.e. Ryyxx jj ≤−+− 2121 )()( . If it is not, then node Sj thinks node Si
is not its neighbor and only forwards the authenticated claim. Otherwise, node Sj computes LHi=H(xi|yi)
and provides a neighbor proof vj=H(IDi, LHi, kj) for node Si. Node Sj forwards the authenticated claim and 
neighbor proof (zi, vj, IDi, LHi, IDj,  EK{xi, yi}, LHj) to CH.  
If its revoked nodes list contains nod Si, then node Si is a replica node and node Sj will ignore all 
messages from the node Si. Intuitively, if a node is confirmed to be a replica node and is revoked from 
cluster, then the replica node will be isolated and unable to send messages. 
(3) Detection and revocation 
On receiving the authenticated claim from node Si, CH first checks whether there is a neighbor proof. If 
there is, CH verifies whether the neighbor proof is valid or not, that is, CH computes secret pair-wise 
share key kj=f(GID, IDCH|LHCH, IDj|LHj) between CH and node Sj , and verifies vj=H(IDi, LHi, kj). If it 
holds, CH believes the neighbor proof is valid and computes the secret share key ki=f(GID, IDCH|LHCH,
IDi|LHi) between CH and node Si , and verifies authenticated claim zi=H(IDi, LHi, ki). If it holds, then CH 
believes the authenticated claim is valid and the node Si is a legal node. CH accepts node Si’s
communication request.  
If the authenticated claim is not valid, or there is no a neighbor proof, CH thinks that the node Si is a 
replica node and refuses the node Si’s communication request. Furthermore, CH broadcasts a node 
revocation message to node Si’s neighbor nodes. The node Si’s neighbor nodes receive the revocation 
message and add the node Si into the revoked nodes list. Therefore the replica node will be isolated and 
unable to send messages. 
3.2.2. Replication detection in effective range  
By above detection, we can only detect the replica nodes deployed in non-effective range, but not 
detect the replica nodes deployed in effective range. If the replica nodes are deployed in effective range, 
we could detect the replica nodes based on travel-time. For simplicity, we only consider a replica node 
CS1 of node S1, and CS1 is deployed in effective range as Fig. 2 shows. 
In order to detect replica nodes in effective range, each node maintains a timetable about the travel-
time TT of its neighbor nodes, which is transmission time that a data packet is transmitted from its 
neighbor node to itself. For example, node S1’s neighbors are the nodes S2, S3, S4, S5, then node S1
maintains a timetable as shows in Table1.  Where F denotes the state of a node. F=0 denotes a legal node; 
F=1 denotes a replica node.  
When a replica node CS1 sends a message to its neighbor node S2, the replica node CS1 must also send 
the time T1 of sending the message. Node S2 first computes the travel-time |1|1 TTt −= , where T is the 
time of receiving message from replica node CS1. Then node S2 seeks for the timetable to obtain the 
travel-time TT1 according to node’s ID, and checks whether the time difference between the travel-time 
TT1 and 1t  is smaller than a pre-defined system threshold time t. i.e. ttTT ≤− |11| . If it not so, node S2 asks 
the replica node CS1 to send a test packet to node S2, node S2 checks again the travel-time. If
still ttTT >− |11| , then node S2 considers that S1 is compromised and CS1 is a replica node. Therefore, the 
replica node CS1 can be detected according travel-time unless the replica node CS1 is deployed on the 
circle where S1 lies or the difference between S1’s travel-time and it’s replica node CS1’s travel-time is 
smaller than a threshold time t. It is noted that there is little benefit to the attacker of having a replica node 
in the smaller range as another compromised node [2].    
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4.   Security and Overhead analysis 
4.1. Security  analysis 
By above replica nodes detection, our scheme can prevent replica nodes from communicating with CH. 
If the replica nodes of the node are deployed in non-effective range of the node, its neighbor nodes can 
detect the replica nodes by checking the authenticated claim and neighbor proof. For simplicity, suppose 
that the adversary has already compromised node S1 and placed a replica node CS1 of S1 in the in non-
effective range of S1 as Fig. 3 shows. 
                                                                                              Table.1 timetable
                                                            
                                                            
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
Fig. 2 CS1 in the effective range of S1 Fig 3  CS1 in the non-effective range of S1         
From our scheme description, we see that the replica node CS1 can only send correct identity ID1 and 
(x1, y1), CS1 can pass the authenticated claim, that is, CH can confirm whether identity ID, location 
LH1=(x1||y1), and secret key k is correct or not by verifying z1=H(ID1, LH1, k1). However, if the replica 
node CS1 sends correct (x, y), then its neighbor node Sj can find the replica node CS1 is not its neighbor by 
checking the distance between the CS1 and node Sj , that is, node Sj checks Ryyxx jj ≤−+− 2121 )()( .
Because the replica node CS1 of S1 is deployed in non-effective rang of S1, the distance between the CS1
and node Sj does not satisfy the above equation. Therefore, the neighbor node Sj can find that the replica 
node CS1 is not its neighbor and does not provide neighbor proof for the replica node CS1. Without the 
neighbor proof, CH believes that the node CS1 is a replica node. 
If the replica node CS1 of the node S1 is deployed in effective range of S1, its neighbor nodes cannot 
detect the replica node CS1 by checking the authenticated claim and neighbor proof. However, its 
neighbor nodes can detect the replica node CS1 by the travel-time unless the replica node CS1 is deployed 
on the circle where S1 lies or the difference between S1’s travel-time and it’s replica node CS1’s travel-time 
is smaller than a threshold time t. It is noted that there is little benefit to the attacker of having a replica 
node in the smaller range as another compromised node. Therefore, our scheme can detect replica nodes. 
(2) From the above description, we can see that its neighbour nodes couldn’t detect it when the replica 
node CS1 of the node S1 is deployed on the circle where S1 lies. But this probability is small. We will make 
some three assumptions before we analyze this case. First, we assume that there are n replica nodes and 
they are deployed in the effective range of the node S1. Second, we consider sensor node as a circle whose 
radius is r and its communication range is R. Finally, we could assume that the replica nodes are deployed 
in network by the same probability. According to the assumption, we could estimate that the number of 
locating on the circle is rRπ  and the number of locating in the effective range is R2/r2. The probability 
that a replica node is deployed on circle is Pc =π r/R, and thus, the probability that n replica nodes are all 
deployed on circle is ∏=
=
⋅ni
i R
r
1
π . So the probability of detecting replica nodes is ∏
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4.2. Overhead analysis 
From the above description, we can clearly see that our scheme does not introduce any significant 
communication, computation, or storage overhead. Each node only needs to check whether the distance 
between the deployment points two is smaller than a pre-defined system wide threshold distance R and 
can immediately determine whether to provides the neighbour proof. Each node only needs to perform a 
hash computation in order to establish communication with CH. Therefore the efficiency of our scheme is 
high. The storage overhead only includes a key of constant size and a neighbour timetable for each node, 
a share polynomial for cluster head. Therefore, the storage overhead of our scheme is low. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a replication detection scheme for sensor networks that takes advantage of 
the authenticated claim and neighbour proof and travel-time to resist node replication attacks. Our scheme 
could stop the replica nodes to communicate with CH by binding the key material with ID and 
deployment location. In this way, it is very convenient to detect replica nodes for us because replica nodes 
are limited to a smaller zone. Moreover, our scheme is that communication overhead is every low because 
nodes needn’t periodically detect the replica nodes.  
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